Methods for distributing results in exploratory partnerships by Gardet, Elodie & Felix, Pierre-Laurent
Methods for distributing results in exploratory
partnerships
Elodie Gardet, Pierre-Laurent Felix
To cite this version:
Elodie Gardet, Pierre-Laurent Felix. Methods for distributing results in exploratory partner-
ships. Technology Analysis and Strategic Management, Taylor & Francis (Routledge): SSH
Titles, 2013, 25 (4), pp.445-458. <10.1080/09537325.2013.774345>. <hal-01287002>
HAL Id: hal-01287002
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01287002
Submitted on 11 Mar 2016
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
Methods for distributing results in exploratory 
partnerships  
 
 
Elodie Gardet, IREGE, Université de Savoie 
Pierre Laurent FELIX, INSEEC  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Development partnerships enable companies to develop new products and/or processes while sharing costs. In 
addition to uncertainty and increased risk, these partnerships necessitate adapted management techniques. In 
particular, partners must determine the distribution of results and methods of distribution. This article describes 
different results in development partnerships according to their methods of distribution. A qualitative study of 
three exploratory projects, developed in the MINATEC IDEAs Laboratory®, offers a better understanding of 
the chosen methods and influential factors. Before the collaboration, partners preferred egalitarian divisions, 
because it was difficult to identify the resources and skills necessary in the project. However, this method of 
distribution provided less incentive than an equitable distribution. The structural dimensions (number of 
partners, degree of partnership maturity, similarity with core professions) and partners‘ behaviours (level of 
implication, interest in the project) also influenced the method of distribution implemented. 
 
Keywords: Exploratory partnership, distribution of results, innovation 
 
 
 
In organisational relationships, partners often cannot accurately forecast the risks 
inherent to alliances, particularly in exploratory partnerships that are, by their very nature, 
uncertain (Gillier et al., 2010). Prior to the project start, the partners cannot foresee the likely 
risks, difficulties and outcomes. In turn, it is difficult to define ex ante how to distribute the 
results (Jap 2001), though this distribution decision is essential for encouraging partners to 
collaborate. The rules for sharing responsibilities, resources and quasi-rents must be defined 
to encourage members to transfer key knowledge to the project and maximise chances of 
success. This incentive requires a prior definition of the general rules for sharing output, 
which further ensures the protection of each party‘s contributions. Yet research rarely details 
these rules regarding sharing, or else reviews them in only summary fashion (Bhaskaran and 
Krishnan 2009).  
Prior research suggests two main distributions though: egalitarian (i.e., each partner 
obtains an equivalent result) or equitable (i.e., the distribution is proportional to the resources 
and skills contributed by each partner). To choose between them, partners must identify the 
influential dimensions; accordingly, this article aims to analyse the situations in which it is 
preferable to use egalitarian versus equitable distribution. We begin with a summary of prior 
literature on the specificities of exploratory partnerships, the types of results that can be 
produced and possible methods for distributing these outputs. Then we present three 
exploratory innovation projects, developed in partnerships in the MINATEC IDEAs 
Laboratory, and outline the data we collected to analyse them. The results address the 
methods of distribution adopted by the partners in these projects, as well as the dimensions 
that influenced these choices. 
From exploration to distribution methods  
An exploratory partnership is a particular form of R&D collaboration, which possesses 
specific significance for the study of result distributions, as well as unique incentives.  
Specificities of an exploration partnership 
 In the past 15 years, various new forms of collaboration between companies have 
arisen (Doz and Hamel 1998), as evidenced by the number of hybrid forms (e.g. alliances, 
consortiums, joint ventures, agreements). For this study, we define collaboration as ‗a 
situation in which two organisations or more share resources and activities in order to follow 
a strategy‘ (Johnson et al., 2008, p. 461), designed to respond to or anticipate the needs and 
evolutions of a market. They also can be motivated by a wish to share risks and costs to 
develop a new product. This means of development appears well adapted to innovation. 
New models of open innovation (Chesbrough 2003) encourage companies to 
undertake some R&D in partnership with others, which produce new organisational forms: 
research consortiums, co-development projects, joint ventures and exploration partnerships 
(Gillier et al., 2010). In particular, an exploration partnership involves companies 
undertaking innovation by pursuing ‗investigation activity and recognition of new fields of 
action, or more specifically, ―fields of innovation‖‘ (Segrestin 2006, p. 6). The partners  
simultaneously assess technical possibilities and value spaces (Le Masson, Weil, and 
Hatchuel 2006). Thus exploration partnerships go beyond the simple co-development of an 
innovative product or service. Exploration activity implies that partners lack a concrete idea 
of what the final result of the collaboration will be. Along the way, they construct the object 
of their collaboration, or their common purpose (Gillier et al., 2010). Exploration therefore 
differs from systems of conception in which identified experts define specifications using 
known characteristics of the product or service. Instead, there is considerable, inherent 
uncertainty in exploration. 
The exploratory partnership also can take different forms, according to its structure 
(see Table 1), such as an alliance (or joint venture), consortium or project team hosted by one 
partner. However, the type of structure determines the mechanisms for coordination and 
control (Segrestin 2006), such that the choice of partner is crucial (Emden, Calantone, and 
Droge 2006; Todeva and Knoke 2005; Kang and Kang 2010). Is it preferable to choose 
complementary partners or radically different ones (in terms of skills, markets)? For Bierly 
and Gallagher (2007), partner selection should reflect the resources and skills needed for the 
collaboration. Nooteboom et al. (2007) instead suggest the partners should have some form 
of compatibility, which depends on their degree of similarity. If partners are greatly alike 
(e.g. equivalent financial resources, skills, similar managerial practices), the alliance has 
significant action potential but limited exploratory potential (Kang and Kang 2010). 
Conversely, if the partners are radically different, their cognitive distance causes difficulties 
in understanding, which can undermine the management of the alliance but favour 
exploration. 
Table 1. Legal forms and contractual arrangements in exploration partnerships 
 Joint Venture PLC Partnership 
 Collaboration 
Agreement 
Control Joint Key person Key person Co-governance 
Decision Power  
Multiple voting 
rights  
Voting rights 
proportional to 
shares 
Unanimity 
Multiple 
voting rights 
Result 
Distribution 
Method  
Proportion of the 
shares 
Proportion of 
the shares  
Proportion of the 
shares  
Defined a 
priori 
Notes: Adapted from Segrestin (2006, p. 133). 
 Furthermore, a central characteristic of an exploratory partnership is its intrinsic 
instability, in connection with its exploration activity. This characteristic causes tensions and 
may make result distribution methods more complex. The intrinsic instability of an 
exploratory partnership relates to its flexibility, because to respond to technological and 
commercial uncertainties, an exploratory partnership must adapt to its environment. The 
resulting innovation is a key sustainable competitive advantage (Nelson and Winter 1982), 
though researchers still question the best way to develop such competitive advantages. 
Various works confirm the importance of organisational variables (Griffin and Page 1993; 
Yap and Souder 1994; Malik and Wei 2011), with increasing attention devoted to the internal 
functioning of alliances (Dhanaraj and Parkhe 2006; Rothaermel and Deeds 2004). 
Exploratory partnerships may improve the chances of success for innovative projects, 
because they enable risk sharing and exchanges of information and know-how (Gillier et al., 
2010). They also encourage training and are more conductive to innovation than are 
individual companies (Powell, Koput, and Smith-Doerr 1996). As a strategic tool, an 
exploratory partnership offers a solution that partners can use to acquire new skills or develop 
new technology quickly. To these ends, different partners share project risks to greater or 
lesser extents, using the different tactics available to them and exchanging resources and 
skills (Goes and Park 1997; Powell 1987). Other potential advantages include increased 
profits, greater client satisfaction and reduced development time, which implies lower costs 
as well. Despite these benefits, some research implies that they cannot guarantee success 
(Karlsson 1997), especially when the inherent tension of collaboration produces high 
functional and collaboration costs that endanger innovation activity (Cooper 1999). In this 
setting, the distribution of results could be an important means to minimise these risks (Jap 
2001; Leiblein and Madsen 2009).  
The high level of uncertainty and increased risk associated with the specificities of 
exploratory partnerships create questions about the best methods for distributing results 
between partners. Despite the difficulties associated with choosing these methods from the 
outset, this choice appears absolutely essential to encourage partners to collaborate (Segrestin 
2006). 
Incentives through distribution 
 The outcomes of an exploration partnership can vary in nature and be subject to 
bimodal distribution. For example, the decision to undertake a collective exploratory project 
implies a strategic logic that pursues a portfolio of real options (McMillan and McGrath 
2000). Real options refer to ‗limited investments that generate several opportunities for future 
development‘ (Johnson et al. 2008, p. 407), and they consist of three types: positioning 
options, springboard options and exploration options characterised by their degrees of 
technical and market uncertainty (see Figure 1). 
Figure 1. Categorisation of development options 
 
Notes: Adapted from McMillan and McGrath (2000, p. 176). 
 
For this study, exploration options correspond to the exploration logic of Segrestin 
(2006): experiments whose main objective is to define innovative concepts, even without 
knowledge of the market or technology in advance. They represent entrepreneurial 
experiments that aim to discover and/or create new markets for products and services by 
using abilities obtained in other fields of investigation (McMillan and McGrath 2000). By 
choosing an exploration option, the company commits to launching an innovative project in a 
dedicated, independent structure, such that it is not subject to the constraints of internal 
development, which matches the research assertion that ‗Exploring innovative opportunities 
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by creating an external entity such as a partnership is highly recommended … (Bower and 
Christensen, 1995; Foss, 2003)’ (Gillier et al., 2010, p. 885).  
In turn, its exploratory activities enable the company to develop new skills, register 
new patents, construct models and tackle new concepts, such that their ‗form of innovation … 
moves away from the company‘s existing central skills based on clients or technology‘ 
(Chanal and Mothe 2005, p. 5). Because exploration entails more than an attempt to produce 
an innovation that answers needs, the related activity generates learning and leads to the 
development of new skills, depending on the explorer‘s preceding career path, knowledge of 
instruments and existing skills (Gillier et al., 2010). 
 Then the results of this exploration activity (whether financial or not) must be 
distributed, which provides an essential motivating factor (Sakakibara 1997). However, little 
research proposes appropriate solutions for such distribution (Catelin 2002;Kumar and Nti 
1998). According to sparse literature on distribution sharing (Jap, 2001; Kabanoff 1991), two 
sharing principles are most common: equity and equality. The complex distribution of results 
(Blanchot 2006) should depend on norms of justice, which vary across groups and cultures. 
Equity is not universally considered superior to equality, though ‗in collaborative relations 
where economic productivity is the first objective, equity rather than equality tends to be the 
principle directive force in distributive justice…. With the aim of encouraging and rewarding 
the contributions of those who are most capable, results are distributed according to the 
inputs‘ (Kabanoff 1991, p. 417). An equitable distribution of results, chosen prior to the 
collaboration, should encourage members of the partnership to exert effort and perhaps 
enhance success likelihoods (Jap 2001; Kabanoff 1991). The ratio of distribution may reflect 
decision makers‘ perceptions of the members of the team (Adams 1963), often based on 
elements such as: 
 Sharing of tasks (Arino and De La Torre 1998; Inkpen and Beamish 1997; Kogut 
1989; Larsson et al. 1998).  
 Sharing of information (Borys and Jemison 1989; Mohr and Spekman 1994). 
 Commitment (Anderson and Weitz 1992). 
If a distribution seems inequitable to members, the alliance results are affected (Kumar and 
Nti 1998). If members perceive they are being treated unequally, the level of commitment by 
the disadvantaged partner diminishes. Systems based on equitable distribution also encourage 
competition among members and risk taking to increase profits. The resulting rivalry can 
paralyse collaboration. Jap (2001) asserts that the ability to separate each organization‘s input 
to the partnership and the joint creation of idiosyncratic input improves relationship quality in 
general. But the use of more complex sharing principles, such as the equity principle, when 
the parties have an understanding of each other's transformation process, has a negative 
impact on relationship quality. He therefore suggests that the use of an equity principle when 
an organization can map a reasonable expectation of the payoff ex ante may be excessive. For 
these reasons, equitable distribution is preferable only in certain cases. 
 An egalitarian distribution instead implies uniformity and a lack of differentiation of 
the members of the partnership. Different members obtain an equivalent share of the results, 
regardless of the resources and skills they contribute (i.e. equal shares, independent of 
investment) (Jap 2001). The possible injustice created by this distribution represents a 
significant risk that even might alter the functioning of the partnership. However, this system 
offers the advantage of encouraging more collaborative, non-competitive behaviour 
(Brickley, Smith, and Zimmerman 1997).  
Table 1. Comparison of two distributions  
 Equitable Distribution Egalitarian Distribution 
Definition 
 Each partner's outcomes are a 
function of its resource 
contributions (tangible and 
intangible) to the exploratory 
 Each partner receives an equal 
share of the outcomes. It is a 
50/50 split 
partnership 
Main 
advantages 
 Efficient when the partners offer 
high financial or technical 
contributions 
 Advisable when partners 
contribute at different levels. 
 Easy to implement, especially 
when there are various, hard-to-
measure resources 
 Facilitates close cooperation 
among partners (social 
relationship and dissension 
reduction) 
Main 
disadvantages 
 Evaluation of the assets 
contributed by each partner is 
quite subjective. 
 Often favours the larger firm.  
 Less incentive, because it can 
favour opportunistic behaviour  
 More difficult to find a ‗hub 
firm‘ to manage the project 
 
In summary, the challenges of both means of distribution suggest it is not possible to 
retain one instead of the other (see Table 1). Prior literature on distribution methods thus 
offers some hints about the dimensions that influence this choice, by noting that ‗Much 
attention has been given to how organizations "expand the pie" of benefits between them; 
however, there is little that addresses the ensuing issue: how organizations divide the 
expanded pie‘ (Jap, 2001: 86). In such a situation, an exploratory study can lead to better 
comprehension of the main characteristics that determine the choice. Accordingly, we 
conduct an exploratory analysis of  several projects that share some common points but also 
differ enough to reveal dimensions that influence the choice of distribution method. 
Three exploration projects from the MINATEC IDEAs Laboratory®
1
 
 To investigate result distribution methods in the specific context of exploration 
activity in a collaborative situation, we begin by describing our methodology, then detail the 
case study we use, which features the MINATEC IDEAs Laboratory and three exploration 
projects that emerged from it. 
Exploratory study  
Because we aim for a better understanding of the methods of distribution in exploration 
partnerships and the dimensions that influence these choices, we undertook an exploratory 
case study to investigate key phenomena in context. Case studies can help accomplish various 
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 MINATEC IDEAs Laboratory and MINATEC are the names registered by the CEA. 
aims: to provide description, test theory or generate theory for example (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Our main aim is to describe and analyse a complex phenomenon that has received insufficient 
attention. In addition, the case study method can provide more in-depth and rich information 
about a phenomenon than surveys and quantitative methods do (Yin, 2003), which allows for 
a careful observation of the focal phenomenon (Eisenhardt, 1989). This approach also offers 
a more complete view of the various causes of each phenomenon and their potential 
interactions (Miles and Huberman 2003). Finally, we can adapt this approach to the research 
context, as needed.  
We carried out 20 semi-directive interviews that lasted, on average, one and one-half 
hours. The interviews, with different members of the exploration partnerships (including 
those legally responsible for the partnerships, or project leaders) (see Table 2), had the 
objective of understanding the result distribution methods and the dimensions that influenced 
the choice of methods. Each interview thus concentrated on partnership characteristics, the 
collaboration between members and incentive mechanisms implemented, as well as the 
means used to distribute the results. 
All respondents agreed to allow a digital audio recording of the interview. We began by 
explaining how the interview would be conducted and assuring them of the confidentiality of 
their remarks. We created a summary and complete transcript of each interview immediately 
after its completion. To supplement the interview data, we gathered secondary internal data 
(e.g. meeting minutes, partnership contracts, documents describing innovation projects) and 
external data (e.g. press releases). Through manual coding of each interview and the 
secondary data, we derived a dictionary of themes (as described in the next section) that 
constituted the material for the analysis. 
Description of exploratory partnership and three projects 
The MINATEC IDEAs Laboratory is a partnership based in Grenoble, next to the 
French Center of Research in Micro-nanotechnology (MINATEC). It comprises eight 
partners: six industrial and two academic members. Since 2003, the partnership also has 
included several corporate partners that, for strategic reasons, wish to remain anonymous. A 
memorandum of understanding (MOU) among CEA-Leti, France Telecom, ST 
Microelectronics and Hewlett-Packard, signed in 2001, prefigured the creation of the 
MINATEC IDEAs Laboratory partnership in Grenoble, France. The partnership was made 
public in 2003, when its name was registered with the Institut National de la Propriété 
Industrielle, which changed the set-up from a simple multilateral agreement to a detailed 
contractual alliance agreement. The MINATEC IDEAs Laboratory defines itself as a 
‗platform whose mission is to imagine new frequently used objects and services based on 
advances in micro and nanotechnologies‘ (Table 2). This declared ambition reveals its 
exploratory nature (i.e. discovering technological fields and new applications), rather than 
simple technological developments. The stated aim of the partnership is to ‗imagine new 
frequently used objects and services based on advances in micro and nanotechnologies‘, so it 
works with state-of-the-art technology and micro- and nanotechnologies to design, 
characterise and produce mechanisms and systems that can be controlled on the nanometre 
scale. Thus MINATEC IDEAs Laboratory can be qualified as an exploratory partnership, 
because of the nature of its exploration: At the beginning of each project, the partners do not 
know the outcomes a priori. The only certainty is that the innovation will involve micro- and 
nanotechnology. The return on investment is measured as new concepts created.  
 
Table 2. Descriptive summary of MINATEC IDEAs Laboratory partnership (2009) 
MINATEC IDEAs Laboratory® 
Statute 
Partnership of companies and universities, implying the creation of an ad 
hoc structure 
Year of 
creation 
2001 
Profession 
To imagine, propose and validate by the use of new applications and 
objects integrating micro- and nanotechnologies 
Number of 
partners 
7 partners 
Size ~ 60 individuals 
Form of 
authority 
Centralised: decisions made by executive authority (management 
committee) 
Division of 
work 
Professional groups  
 
In 2009, MINATEC IDEAs Laboratory had seven members: Bouygues, Renault, 
EDF, the CEA, Isere County Council and two Grenoble-area universities (Pierre Mendès 
France: Human and Social Sciences and Stendhal: Literature, Languages and 
Communication). Since 2003, the partnership also has included corporate partners such as 
Hewlett-Packard, Essilor, France Telecom, Rossignol, STMicroelectronics and Teamlog, as 
well as others that for strategic reasons wish to remain anonymous. 
The current partners have varying characteristics, so the MINATEC IDEAs 
Laboratory can be qualified as an asymmetric partnership. The differences among partners 
(e.g. size, resources) can lead to difficulties, such as a lack of trust between partners (Sarkar 
et al. 2001), a delicate approach to development (Smith and Barclay 1997) or conflicts over 
how to share the results (Das and Teng 2001). In addition, the need for heterogeneity among 
the partners pushed the management of MINATEC IDEAs Laboratory to include 
organisations from different sectors.
2
 This express decision, instituted at the origin of the 
partnership, aimed to ensure that the innovations would be situated in different sectors (e.g. 
research, optics, sport, telecommunication), which might stimulate the innovation process 
through sharing, making experience and expertise available and creating common synergies 
(through joint projects). In this sense, MINATEC IDEAs Laboratory counts cross-fertilisation 
as a major asset in its activity, re-enforced by a lack of competition between partners. 
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 A direct industrial competitor of one of the partners can apply to enter though. Admission requires a 
unanimous vote by the representatives of the partners who sit on the management committee.  
 The partnership also is legally coordinated by contracts among the different partners. 
These contractual agreements determine the methods of participation and distinguish three 
status levels: main partners, partners-projects and occasional partners. Main partners are all 
part of the management committee (CODIR) and have rights to veto admittance of new 
partners or enlarge the circle of main partners. Partner-projects have the same rights as the 
main partners but only for a specific project. Finally, occasional partners are admitted for 
precise, short-term missions. Thus this partnership enables partners to share the risks and 
costs involved in each project. Finally, occasional partners are admitted into MINATEC 
IDEAs Laboratory for a precise, short-term mission, such as when Ecole Nationale 
Supérieure en Création Industrielle helped the laboratory set up design workshops in 2008. 
Strategic decisions for the partnership are made by the executive authority, namely, the 
management committee. It determines and validates future research directions and partners; 
that is, the laboratory is managed not by one partner in particular but collectively, which 
differentiates it from other structures (not partnerships), such as Medialab at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Interuniversity Microelectronics Centre (IMEC), I-
Lab or the California Institute for Telecommunications and Information Technology 
(Cal(it)²). We also distinguish MINATEC IDEAs Laboratory from internal R&D structures in 
various companies, such as Orange Lab (Orange), e-lab (Bouygues), Philips Home Lab 
(Philips), Cre@team (EDF), the Palo Alto research center (Xerox Corporation) or Sony CSL 
(Sony). In effect, MINATEC IDEAs Laboratory represents a common structure linking 
companies and universities. 
Organised in project modes, research within the partnership relies on different 
disciplines, whether in social sciences (sociology, anthropology, ergonomics, economics) or 
engineering (programming, engineering).  the partnership often focuses on large domains that 
encompass various elements and services, such as the automobile sector, health, 
telecommunications, textiles or leisure. The specific project partnerships tend to be relatively 
small and are managed by a project manager who answers directly to the management 
committee. As we show in Table 2, the three projects we investigate—MagicBall, Map 
Mobile and Interfaces Visuelles—evolved within the same structure but also vary in their 
length, number of participating partners, objectives pursued and technologies used. 
 
Table 2. Nature of focal exploratory projects  
Characteristics Magicball Map Mobile 
Interfaces 
Visuelles  
Reception structure  MINATEC IDEAs Laboratory 
 Maturity of partnership Creation Maturity 
P
ro
je
ct
 
Expected results  
Models, studies of 
usage 
Models, studies of 
usage  
Concepts, models 
Number of partners 6 4 9 
Basic technology  Accelerometer Accelerometer 
Photochromic 
glasses  
Length of project 2 years 3 months 3 years 
Heterogeneity of core 
professions 
Similar Similar Heterogeneous 
Interest of partners in the 
project 
Strong Strong Medium 
Partner providing 
technology 
CEA Essilor 
D
a
ta
 c
o
ll
ec
te
d
 
Number of interviews  6 4 10 
People interviewed 
 Prescribers of 
project (1), legally 
responsible members 
(5) 
Prescribers of 
project (1), legally 
responsible 
members (3) 
Prescribers of 
project (1), legally 
responsible 
members (8) 
Internal data 
Participation contracts, project specifications, meeting minutes, 
summary of activity 
External data  Internet sites, specialised and general press articles  
 
The MagicBall and Map Mobile projects were initiated prior to the official start of the 
partnership (2002 and 2003), then continued after its creation. They use similar technologies 
and have parallel objectives (virtual displacement in space). The MagicBall project aimed to 
construct a prototype of a 3D mouse that could facilitate navigation across three-dimensional 
images. Its principle was based on intuitive gestures that would make it possible to move in 
virtual space. The partners all participated in achieving the prototype; several applications 
were envisaged and tested, including a skill-based navigation game using multimedia data 
(e.g. IGN® maps). 
Map Mobile launched in 2003, with the initiative of the founder partners (CEA, ST 
Microelectronics, France Telecom and Hewlett-Packard). It proposed a system for interactive 
localization inside and outside buildings. The project lasted three months, between the 
definition of the concept in spring 2003 and the construction of the first functional prototype.  
Finally, the Interfaces Visuelles project started in 2006 at the initiative of the Essilor 
company, followed by the participation of all the partners (CEA, France Telecom, EDF, 
UPMF, U3, Teamlog, Rossignol and a confidential partner). The objective was to define 
concepts based on elements in personal spheres, using emerging technologies that enabled 
new visual interactions. This project lasted three years (2006–2008). We consider these 
project details carefully to analyse the dimensions that influence distribution choices.  
Heterogeneous forms of distribution 
To describe the three focal projects carried out in the MINATEC IDEAs Laboratory, we 
first consider the question of incentives, then move to the results. 
Result distribution as an incentive  
The result distribution methods for the three projects were specified in the contracts and 
referred to two alternative types of results. First, ideas and knowledge produced in the 
partnership could be integrated and reused by all partners except two: a (main) partner that 
could not access the knowledge and ideas before it officially entered into the partnership (i.e. 
without specific agreement), and an occasional partner, which only had access to the ideas 
and knowledge produced in the project on which it was is working, without any right of 
access to other projects‘ results. Second, the projects could result in industrial property with a 
patent. As a partnership, MINATEC IDEAs Laboratory chose to adopt a co-property 
regulation implying the distribution of ‗The rights to equal shares of the invention, whatever 
the means that are implemented, and rights to the resulting Patent will belong to each party in 
equal shares‘ (standard participation contract, 2004, Article 3: Coproperty). 
Furthermore, the distribution of the results depends on whether the new knowledge 
belongs to one of the partners or all partners. In the former situation, each party can exploit 
its own results and/or intellectual property, acquired or achieved during the execution of the 
contract, without providing financial returns to other parties. In the latter situation, all parties 
can exploit the results without having to compensate other parties. The results obtained in the 
three projects thus differ in nature, though all of them provided a concept definition. Usability 
testing was performed for MagicBall and Interfaces Visuelles. Others types of results also 
emerged, as we describe in Table 3.  
Table 3. Results distributed in each project 
 MagicBall Map Mobile Interfaces Visuelles 
Basic 
results 
Concept definition 
Working prototype 
Usability testing 
Concept definition 
Working prototype 
Concept definition 
Concept testing 
Working prototypes 
Usability testing 
Commercial agreement  
Refined 
results 
Usability scenario  
Numeric maps 
Development of micro-
accelerometer (MEMS) 
Possibility of WiFi 
triangulation 
Development of 3D 
magnetometer 
Interactive make-up box 
Semi-immersive glasses 
Liquid Crystal Shutter 
Mobile hypertext 
technology 
 
The distributions of these results also differ, as we describe next.  
Choosing between equitable and egalitarian distribution 
For the MagicBall and Map Mobile projects, the partnership opted for egalitarian 
distribution. The inventions originating from these partnership activities thus were the equally 
shared property of the parties that had invested in the project. All these partners were owners 
of the inventions created, and requests for patents were registered, with shared costs and 
equal shares. For these projects, the partnership was still in the process of determining its 
structure, and these two projects were its first collective creations. The partners represented 
relatively closely linked core professions (i.e. embedded microelectronics and 
telecommunications) and had similar interests. In turn, they appeared satisfied with the results 
obtained and validated the choice of an egalitarian distribution. 
I found it a very good thing. That‘s to say that there was a part with a common core, 
where we shared the industrial property. And then, at a certain moment, there was 
concrete material, consisting of models and returns on the experiences gained in the 
experimenting which each company could make use of. Therefore, if there were 
patents to be registered for the Lab, they would be just basic elements in the sector, 
[and] after that each company could work on his own part with things that were quite 
clear (Map Mobile, project leader).  
The two projects also included the same partners, so the interviews illustrate a collective 
work situation and considerable implications across both projects. The choice of an 
egalitarian distribution also might be justified because the partners represent different 
markets and thus would not compete as the technology develops. 
The means adapted to situations in which the partners learn to work together and in 
which the different professions encounter one another (sociologists, engineers, etc.) 
and different markets (Magicball, manager of legal department). 
The dependence of the partners on the technologies proposed by the CEA also motivated the 
choice of an egalitarian distribution. The CEA actually provides most of the technology used 
in the three projects, which leaves the other partners with relatively limited margins for 
manoeuvring with regard to the results. 
The only partner that cannot leave is the CEA. We can try it: we can remove any one 
of them and the system still survives. I think that if we removed the CEA, the system 
would survive but there wouldn‘t be the same orientation. From this point of view, the 
other partners have a limited margin for manoeuvring with regard to the results 
obtained (Magicball, manager of legal department). 
However, the Interfaces Visuelles project featured an evolution in the means of 
distribution. This case included many partners—nine at the outset. The partnership also was 
far more mature, in that it already had existed for five years and was not launching its first 
project. We thus observed an effect of experience. The participating partners had grown 
accustomed to working together, and the operational team was stable, in both its composition 
and its organisation. Unlike the MagicBall and Map Mobile projects, the partners opted for an 
equitable distribution of the results, motivated by their recognition that the fields of 
application did not involve every partner. The respondents we interviewed expressed only an 
average level of satisfaction though, because the results obtained were below the level they 
had hoped for.  
I saw the short film on the visual interface models, it was very nice, it was sold quite 
well, it was well done, but in the end, if we measure the difference between our 
intentions in the beginning and the results, there was quite a flagrant gap. We have 
progressed on interesting concepts, but in its current state, it still isn‘t as prolific as it 
could do (Interfaces Visuelles, manager of legal department). 
Thus for Magic Ball and Map Mobile, the distribution sharing method is egalitarian, 
because that approach offers more advantages than limitations. Nor did the distribution mode 
change over the course of the projects. Several factors may explain this stability in 
distribution mode: The projects were initiated during the creation of the overall partnership, 
which ensured strong involvement, and the partners‘ businesses were closely related to the 
topics addressed in the project. Furthermore, the patent-protected technology already existed 
and was provided by one partner. Prototyping was facilitated, because the short-term projects 
only entailed technology combinations, and there was just one project manager for each 
project.  
For Interfaces Visuelles though, an equitable distribution may offer more advantages. 
The expectations varied by partners, involving new usages, concepts and models. These 
different expectations affected how the partners regarded the implications of the project 
outcomes. Compared with its potential (value created, financial aspects, concept used), the 
partners reconsidered its actual implications during the project and identified two main 
difficulties that appeared to be caused by the choice of an equitable division. First, the project 
was relatively unconnected with the professions and markets that each partner represented. 
This difficulty challenged the very significance of the project for each of the partners, which 
meant that perceived benefits strongly influenced their investments during and after the 
project. Second, it became a challenge to establish effective performance metrics. Some 
interviewees specifically evoked the difficulty of establishing performance indicators for 
exploratory projects in which not all the partners had an evident interest. Without 
performance metrics, it was more difficult for some partners to identify and quantify results 
that could be relevant for their respective activities.  
In brief, several factors likely explain the change from egalitarian to equitable distribution 
modes: the inclusion of new partners whose businesses differ, a long-term project timeline 
(e.g. more than three years), a complex project (e.g. combination of different technologies in 
a broader concept compared with MagicBall and Map Mobile), a larger project team and 
several project managers. Table 4 contains a summary of the main advantages and limitations 
of each distribution method. 
Table 4. Main advantages and limitations of distribution choice 
 MagicBall Map Mobile Interfaces Visuelles  
Type of 
distribution 
Egalitarian Equitable 
Main 
advantages 
 Collective interest in the projects. 
 All partners try to contribute at the same 
level, which helps ensure partners‘ 
motivation and involvement. 
 Institutional trust exists, and the 
distribution mode allows the persistence 
of such trust. 
 Both projects initiated at the beginning 
of the partnership, so the boundaries 
were unknown. It took less time and was 
easier to establish an equal distribution 
agreement. 
 Each partner conserves and 
protects its specific assets 
(e.g. patents, expertise, 
skills). 
 One partner (i.e. CEA) 
provides the main technical 
contribution. 
 The contributions of each 
partner were clearly 
identified at the beginning of 
the project, which reduced 
the probability of conflict 
about results appropriation.  
Main 
limitations 
 Favours opportunistic behaviours; in 
these examples, two partners captured 
part of the technology for their own 
projects and quickly left the partnership.  
 Any reorientation involves a 
renegotiation of resources 
needed and results 
distributed. It was difficult to 
change the strategic 
orientation chosen at the 
beginning of the project. 
 
In summary, the MINATEC IDEAs Laboratory structure opted ex ante for an egalitarian 
distribution, regardless of the characteristics of the projects and partners. However, the 
Interfaces Visuelles project—which contained more partners than the other two projects, 
occurred when the partnership was no longer in a creation phase and entailed more 
heterogeneity in the core businesses—necessitated a change to the method of distribution. 
Moreover, the implications and interests of the partners differed greatly across the 
organisations. These multiple differences prompted the choice of equitable distribution; in 
particular, the resources and skills provided by each party were too heterogeneous to envisage 
a different type of sharing.  
Discussion 
Literature on exploratory partnerships remains relatively evasive about the best methods 
to distribute results. Beyond their high degrees of uncertainty and risk, these partnerships can 
struggle because the methods of distribution are difficult to set up ex ante, especially when 
the results of the alliance (e.g. identifying a new opportunity, the emergence of new business 
opportunities) and its quasi-rents
3
 cannot be calculated in advance. However, in these 
situations, it is possible:  
 To forecast, before the alliance, how property rights, connected with emerging 
opportunities during the alliance, should be distributed. 
 To determine the percentage of remuneration and envisage a specific clause to address 
unexpected factors. For example, in a collaboration with equivalent proportions (50–
50), members can create a reserve for contingencies in equal proportions, used in the 
case of an unexpected risk. 
Therefore, even though result distributions should not be rigidly defined in an alliance 
proposition (which may have a counter-incentive effect on partners), the principles of 
collaboration can and should be discussed beforehand (Segrestin 2006).  
Types of results  
In exploratory partnerships, two main types of results will emerge and need to be 
distributed: 
 Property and rights to patents, drawings or models, which generally should 
not be distributed to a single actor, to avoid tests of strength.  
 Financial results generated by a market launch, for which, unlike other types 
of inter-organisational relations such as franchise networks, innovation 
partners rarely seem to use quasi-rents (De Guilloux et al. 2004). 
Incentive nature 
The distribution of quasi-rents is often a principal motive for development 
partnerships—as well as a principle cause of arguments to decide on the appropriate 
distribution (equitable or egalitarian). There is no universal rule for the distribution of value, 
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 Quasi-rents derive from cooperation and refer to the surplus profit made by members because of their 
partnership. Quasi-rent is therefore the spread between two profits: that which would have been earned 
without the alliance and that made due to it. 
especially when resources and skills are difficult to measure (Das and Teng 2000). The 
contribution of each member is complicated to determine in an innovation project, which 
requires vast intangible resources (e.g. technique knowledge, market information) that cannot 
be measured in an objective way (cf. financial investment) and are based on the arbitrage of 
each project. The partners can assess the financial contributions of each member but cannot 
objectively determine the value of intangible contributions, such as one partner‘s brand image 
(Urban and Vendemini 1994). Yet despite these challenges and regardless of the uncertainty 
inherent to partnerships and innovation projects, our research shows that it is better to define 
ex ante the rules for the distribution of results, without setting them too rigidly (i.e. Interfaces 
Visuelles case study). They must be redefined according to advances in the project and 
precise identifications of necessary resources and skills. Causes for renegotiation might 
include a weak contribution by certain partners or the advent of an alternative technology. 
Equitable versus egalitarian distribution 
At the beginning of a partnership, partners determine what each will obtain at the end of the 
project. In line with Lucas and Piron‘s (1998, p. 5) summary of the European Tactical 
Missiles Alliance between Matra and Bae Dynamics, we find that equity seems to be the only 
means of creating a certain legitimacy when allocating resources. This question is often 
wrongly reduced to a problem of ‗just returns‘, involving the financial proportionality 
between the contribution in market terms and the contribution in terms of tasks. For the 
prescribers or negotiators of the alliance, the question of just returns can be answered, once 
and for all, prior to the conclusion of the alliance, in financial terms. However equity remains 
a question during the structuring of the project, and beyond. 
Thus the relation between contributions and the compensation of members and the 
influence of this relation on members‘ perception of distributive justice is critical. Yet 
equitable distribution is difficult to establish. It depends on norms of justice, which vary from 
one group to another and across cultures. Equity does not always appear preferable to 
equality; rather, results should be distributed according to outputs, such that the distribution 
encourages and recompenses those members that have invested the most. 
Moreover, when a company makes an investment in an exploratory activity that 
comes close to the activities of other partners, the company should be more inclined to assign 
its rights (Vassolo, Anand, and Folta 2004). By extension, our research indicates that the 
closer the exploratory results are to a company‘s core activities, the more reticent the 
company is to share its results with partners who are only slightly involved. 
Conclusion 
 This article has focused on different types of results and their associated methods of 
distribution. These elements are inherent to partnership relations and particularly difficult to 
implement in an exploratory partnership, which is by nature risky and uncertain. Two main 
contributions emerge from this study:  
 The choice of distribution methods depends on three principal structural dimensions. 
For Map Mobile and MagicBall, the methods were defined from the point of creation 
of the partnership. The number of partners was limited, and the core professions were 
close and even complementary. For Interfaces Visuelles, the broader partnership 
already was well established when the project was launched, and there were many 
stable partners (i.e. few new members and few members leaving). According to these 
findings, equalitarian distribution seems preferable when a partnership is in the 
preliminary stages, there are few partners and the fields of activity are close. An 
equitable distribution instead is preferred when the exploratory partnership includes a 
large number of partners, and their core professions are very different. 
 The methods diverge according to the partners‘ behaviours. The level of contributions 
and interest shown in the project influences the distribution methods chosen. A 
partner that can directly re-appropriate the results of the exploration for its own 
activities will tend to prefer equitable distribution and consider it, in this case, more 
just. 
Along with these contributions, the current study has several limitations. For example, 
with regard to the characteristics of the projects studied, this research has focused on an 
asymmetrical partnership containing partners with varied profiles. It would be interesting to 
study exploratory partnerships between competitive companies, to analyse the possible 
repercussions of these similarities on result distributions. In such a context, the partners 
continue to compete (Nalebuff and Brandenburger 1996), and the partnership creates a high 
risk of opportunism and conflict. In addition, we analysed only one incentive mechanism, 
namely, the methods used to distribute the results. A simultaneous study of several 
motivating mechanisms could reveal other dimensions that also influence the type of 
distribution. For example, the extent of the contract or the degree of confidence among 
partners likely influences the choice of distribution methods. Intuitively, we might imagine 
that when partners trust each other more, the risks of opportunism and quasi-rents decline. 
Thus, partners should be less reticent about opting for an egalitarian distribution, even if they 
have heterogeneous levels of commitment. 
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